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Many couples have had unsuccessful fertility treatments. In 2009, the U.K. government launched an online 
service to provide patients with the success rates of individual clinics. I use anonymized individual patient 
data between 1991 and 2016 with the instrumental variable technique to investigate whether the disclosure 
of success rates induces patients to move to another clinic, resulting in improved treatment outcomes. I find 
four main results. (i) The disclosure increases the probability that a patient moves to another clinic. (ii) The 
greater the number of treatment cycles a patient has previously had, the greater the probability of moving 
to another clinic. (iii) When moving to another clinic, a patient aged over 40 has a higher probability of 
getting one or more transferable embryos in one treatment cycle, while a patient aged under 39 has a low 
probability. (iv) Regardless of age, patients who have had five or more treatments have a higher probability 
of obtaining an embryo in a single treatment cycle. These results suggest that public disclosure of 
information can facilitate efficient matching between clinics and patients over the age of 40 who have had 
unsuccessful IVF attempts, resulting in higher success rates. 
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While fertility treatment such as In Vitro Fertilization (IVF) is becoming more popular, many couples have 
been unsuccessful despite trying it many times.1 According to the UK government’s independent regulator, 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), the success rate of IVF decreases with age (the 
average chance of a birth per embryo transferred in 2017 is 29, 24, 17, 11, 4, and 3 percent for women aged 
under 35, 35-37, 38-39, 40-42, 43-44, over 44, respectively). Moreover, the financial cost of IVF is quite 
expensive and the couple’s, especially, woman’s mental stress increases as the number of the treatment cycle 
(which means the number of trying IVF) increases. Thus, they want to succeed in as few treatment cycles 
as possible.2 
In 2009, HEFA launched "Choose a Fertility Clinic," an online service that provides patients with the 
success rates of each clinic. Not only those who are planning to visit a clinic but also those who have had 
treatment in the past but did not succeed can search for information on age, IVF, or ICSI, whether to transfer 
fresh or frozen embryos, whether to create embryos themselves or use a donor, etc. Thanks to the online 
services, they can find another clinic with a higher success rate than a current clinic. The effects of 
information disclosure on the IVF outcome is of interest to researcher and policymakers. However, we have 
not yet understood how information disclosure affects IVF outcomes by changing patients’ behavior. In 
other words, we have not yet understood whether the unsuccessful patient could receive effective treatment 
from moving to another clinic, resulting in higher success rates. 
This paper examines the effect of the HEFA’s online service on the behavior of patients who have 
previously had and is undergoing IVF. Specifically, I explore the following empirical questions: (I) did the 
information disclosure induce patients to move to another clinic?; (II) did the patients move to a better 
clinic? i.e., was the probability that patients get at least more than one embryo that could be transplanted 
into a womb improved by moving to another clinic? In addition, this study calculates how many deliveries 
change in response to information disclosure through a back-of-the-envelope estimate. 
There are both positive and negative effects of moving to another clinic on IVF outcomes. The positive 
effects arise if patients receive treatment from better doctors and embryologists, resulting in higher success 
rates. The negative effects arise by moving to another clinic. If the patient has been treated at the same clinic 
many times, the doctors at that clinic know the patient's characteristics well. If patients move to another 
clinic, they will give up on the next IVF treatment that might be successful in that clinic. In this paper, I 
investigate which effect is dominant for different age groups. 
Policymakers, especially in developed countries, want to improve the live birth rate. However, it may 
be difficult for women to balance their careers with child-raising (e.g., Astrid et al., 2018). Thus, some 
 
1 In 2017, IVF accounts for 93 percent of total treatment cycles. 
2 Private IVF can cost between £3,000 and £5,000 per cycle. However, some clinics may charge patients for 




women place their positions in their work above children and postpone trying to get pregnant or choose not 
to give birth. Unfortunately, the chance of getting pregnant decreases with age. In such cases, IVF can be 
one of the policy interventions for women worried about infertility. Some countries, such as the UK, the 
US, Denmark, and Japan, introduce an insurance mandate and/or a subsidy that makes it easier for patients 
to access IVF. The UK has the National Health Service (NHS), a tax-funded institution that ensures that UK 
healthcare is free at the point of delivery. Couples/women do not always receive the NHS, but the success 
rate of IVF is still low, and thus they often try IVF many times. That is quite a burden for them from the 
viewpoint of financial costs and mental stress. If patients can choose clinics based on appropriate 
information and succeed with fewer treatments, patients have less mental stress, and the government saves 
the financial cost for insurance and subsidies. This study contributes to understanding the role of information 
disclosure in high treatment costs and low success rates due to mismatching between patients and physicians 
(or treatment plans).  
To answer question (I), I estimate the effect of information disclosure on the probability that a patient 
moves to another clinic. The key assumption for this identification is that in the absence of information 
disclosure, the probability would have changed smoothly. Since the probability may increase year by year 
because of technical progress, I include the year dummy to control that.  
To answer question (II), I examine the effect of moving to another clinic on whether a patient gets at 
least more than one embryo that could be transplanted into a womb. The reason why I use this variable to 
evaluate the quality of the clinic is as follows. IVF involves four main stages and often fails at each stage: 
1) preliminary treatments using medication; 2) collecting the eggs; 3) fertilizing the eggs (embryos); 4) 
transferring the embryo(s) into a womb. Unfortunately, some patients do not often reach stage 4. The key 
to success is how to create at least more than one embryo. Because of technical or medical reasons, no one 
knows which embryos could lead to birth or stop growing, which may be an exogenous event (as Lundborg 
et al., 2018 pointed out). However, we can observe who gets the embryos (i.e., who reaches stage 4) in this 
cycle. If patients obtain one or more embryos, they face a chance of transplanting the embryos (i.e., they 
have a chance of getting pregnant). If they do not, however, the possibility of getting pregnant is completely 
zero. That is why I use a dummy variable indicating whether a patient obtains one or more embryos in one 
treatment cycle as an independent variable.3 
The problem of the identification in question (II) is endogeneity because whether a patient moves to 
another clinic is self-selected based on unobserved characteristics. To overcome the problem, I use a dummy 
variable indicating whether the information is disclosed as an Instrumental Variable (IV). Because 
 
3 When evaluating the outcome of treatment, I do not use how many embryos are created in one cycle to avoid 
misinterpreting the treatment outcome. For example, the treatment policy depends on doctors such as one doctor 
emphasize how to create a high-quality embryo, while another doctor emphasizes how to get a large number of 
embryos. The failure to get the embryos is a bad result, but the creation of a small number of embryos is not 
necessarily a bad result. In this study, in order to capture both treatment policies above, I use the indicator variable 
representing whether or not transplantable embryos have been created in one cycle as an independent variable. 
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disclosure is just a policy variable related to time and does not directly affect the IVF outcome, it is only 
natural to assume that disclosure is uncorrelated with unobserved characteristics of patients. Moreover, in 
the analysis for question (I), I can obtain that the disclosure increases the probability that a patient moves 
to another clinic with statistically significant at 99% confidence level, and the F-statistics referring to F-
tests of the significance of the instrument in the first-stage regressions is 165. Therefore, the disclosure 
affects the probability that a patient gets one or more embryos in one cycle only through the pass that 
patients move to another clinic to receive treatment from a new doctor. In addition, monotonicity or no-
defiers assumption should hold because patients who pay a large financial costs to try IVF have a strong 
demand for a child, and thus there should be no patients who never move to another clinic no matter what 
happens (such as, patients who never move even if they know another clinic with higher success rates than 
the current clinic and have no obstacle to moving). If no-defiers exist, then the only subpopulation in 
which disclosure can affect whether a patient move to another clinic is the compliers.  
The data used in this study are pooled cross-section data composed of patients who have had IVF at 
least once that are drawn from the HFEA’s Anonymized Register. The Register covers the information on 
all fertility treatment including IVF and Donor Insemination (DI) with its outcome between the years 1991 
and 2016, while the personal information such as income, the place of life, and to which clinic patients go, 
is banded or obscured, to protect patient privacy.  
Focusing on the heterogeneity of patients’ characteristics, I decompose the full-sample into the 
following subsample: patients who have previously had IVF or DI between once and two times, three and 
four times, and more than five times. Patients who have had IVF or DI more than five times may have quite 
strong demand for children. So, I would expect that the effect of disclosure on the probability that a patient 
moves to another clinic would be large. In addition, I consider a further specification that uses the 
observation within a three-year window around the year information disclosure started, i.e., I use a 
subsample containing patients who registered between 2006 and 2011.  
Since the conceptual basis of a discontinuity-based estimate is local to the threshold, choosing a sample 
containing observations as close as possible to the discontinuity is generally preferred. However, patients 
can move on to another clinic whenever they want. In other words, they do not have to do that that right 
after searching for information on an individual clinic. Before 2009, when the information was not publicly 
available, there was no information about individual clinics, so when patients wanted to change clinics, they 
would randomly choose a different one. Using the observations between 1991 and 2016, I explore the long-
term effect of accessing the information on the patient’s behavior and the treatment outcome. 
The main findings and policy implications are as follows. (i) The information disclosure significantly 
induces patients to move to another clinic. (ii) The greater the number of treatment cycles a patient has 
previously had is, the larger the probability that a patient move to another clinic is. (iii) Moving to another 
clinic increases the probability of getting one or more transferable embryos in one treatment cycle for 
patients over 40, while it decreases the probability for patients under 39. This suggests that younger patients 
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should try one more cycle in the same clinic, and older patients should move to another clinic to receive the 
treatment from a new doctor, resulting in the reduction of the patient’s financial and psychological costs. 
(iv) Regardless of age, if the number of treatment cycles a patient has previously had is more than five, 
moving to another clinic increases the probability of getting more than one embryo per cycle. This suggests 
that information disclosure promotes efficient matching of clinics with patients who have had unsuccessful 
IVF procedures, which in turn leads to higher success rates. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous literature relating to fertility 
treatment. Section 3 discusses the online service, IVF process, and the patient’s behavior. Section 4 
describes the data. Section 5 provides the empirical strategy. Section 6 presents the main results. Section 7 
discusses the social impact of disclosure from the viewpoint of live birth. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
IVF is a leading reproductive technology for women suffering fertility problems, while it is quite expensive. 
At first, economists focus on the public policy to reduce the patient’s financial burden. Using a difference-
in-differences approach, insurance coverage for IVF, which is mandated in fifteen states of the US, increases 
the first birth rate for women over age 35 (Schmidt 2005, 2007). Because IVF often fails, some patients 
want to transfer multiple embryos to improve the likelihood of birth, which has a risk for high-order birth. 
European countries have introduced embryo caps against such risky treatments. The strict policy, however, 
not only reduces the aggressive treatment but also reduces the likelihood of birth, which can lead some 
patients to forgo IVF. To internalize the expected cost of transferring multiple embryos, a price-based 
incentive policy (i.e. additional costs for transferring additional embryos) has been introduced (Einav, 
Finkelstein, and Williams, 2016; Hamilton et al., 2018). By developing a structural model for IVF that 
considers forward-looking patient’s dynamic decision of treatment, Hamilton et al. (2018) evaluate these 
policies in terms of patients’ surplus and total costs of treatments.4 
However, the actions a patient can take to increase the success rate are not limited to transferring 
multiple embryos into a womb. Patients may move to another clinic to receive treatments from a new doctor, 
hoping that they improve the possibility of live birth. The UK’s Anonymized Register shows that the number 
of patients who have moved is 166,194. 
There are many studies on the impact of hospital performance disclosure on patients' choice of the 
hospital across various medical fields (e.g., Bundorf et al., 2009; Varkevisser et al., 2012; Werner et al., 
2012). In addition, Gutacker et al. (2016) examined what type of specific quality-related information 
 
4 The results are as follows: (i) insurance mandate substantially increases patient welfare by increasing IVF use, 
but it increases both treatment and per-birth costs; (ii) embryos caps reduce per-birth costs but low the probability 
of live birth, resulting in total costs becoming greater than when no patients have insurance; (iii) the additional 
costs can internalize the expected cost of transferring multiple embryos, which generates more patient surplus 
than the embryos cap, and total treatment costs are lower than no-insurance benchmark. 
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patients respond to when choosing a hospital. The results of these analyses showed that regardless of the 
field, patients moved to high-performing hospitals as a result of performance disclosure. Furthermore, in 
the field of infertility treatment, Bundorf et al. (2009) found that clinics that treated only younger patients, 
who were relatively easier to treat, had lower market shares after disclosure. Other studies have analyzed 
the impact of disclosure of one's health status and health risks on one's behavior (e.g., Zhao, Konishi, & 
Glewwe, 2013; Krämer, Kumar and Vollmer, 2021). 
However, previous studies have not analyzed whether treatment outcomes improved after a patient 
moved from one hospital to another. To understand how information disclosure affects the quality of medical 
care, we need to know whether changing hospitals ended up with a positive outcome. Obviously, patients 
have different characteristics, and we need to take that into account. Disclosure has also not been addressed 
in previous studies on policy evaluation for improving success rates in fertility treatment. 
Other studies explore the effect of fertility treatments on the child adoption market and labor market. 
Gumus and Lee (2012) analyzed the causal relationship between the child adoption market and the 
frequency of assisted reproductive technology (ART) treatments. Lundborg, Plug, and Rasmussen (2017) 
analyzed the causal inference of childbearing on women's career and earnings by using IVF success at the 
first cycle as an instrumental variable. 
 
3. In Vitro Fertilization and patient behavior 
 
3.1 Information disclosure  
“Choose a Fertility Clinic”, launched by the HFEA in 2009, is an online service providing patients with 
success rates of the individual clinic. Patients can view some kinds of rating and treatment data for different 
clinics calculated in the same way, such as inspection rating of how the clinic meets HEFA’s standard, 
patient rating based on their experience and care, success rates including birth per embryos transferred, birth 
per egg collection for different ages and donated or non-donated egg, multiple birth rates, and waiting times 
for donated eggs, sperm, and embryos. The success rate includes individual clinic’s rate, national average 
rate, and the reliability range designed to show how confident we are that a clinic will repeat its success rate 
in the future.  
 
3.2 IVF 
Patients choose the type of fertility treatment based on their preferences and the cost of treatment. Because 
of high out-of-pocket costs for IVF, physicians generally suggest the following two types of cheaper fertility 
treatment than IVF: better timing of intercourse (around the woman’s ovulation cycle) and artificial 
insemination. If patients have been trying these treatments several times to get pregnant but have not been 
successful, physicians suggest IVF because it is the best success rate among these options. Many patients 
try it even though the financial cost is about ten times higher than the other methods.  
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IVF involves four main stages: 1) preliminary treatments such as suppressing your natural cycle with 
medication to boost the patient’s egg supply; 2) collecting the eggs—a needle is inserted into the ovaries to 
remove the eggs; 3) fertilizing the eggs—the eggs are mixed with the sperm for a few days to allow them 
to be fertilized; 4) transferring the embryo(s)—1 or multiple fertilized embryos are placed into the womb.5 
If embryo(s) can be generated successfully in stage 3), patients choose to freeze the embryo(s) and transplant 
into the womb later or transplant the embryo(s) immediately. Once the embryo(s) has been transferred into 
a womb, patients need to wait about two weeks before taking a pregnancy test to see if the treatment has 
worked. Once they successfully get pregnant, they are the same as the normal expecting women without 
trying IVF.  
There are two differences among clinics that affect success rates. The first one is the treatment plan. The 
treatment plan differs depending on clinics and patients, such as whether to use medication or how much 
the doctor uses medication before collecting eggs to control hormone balances related to fertility and 
whether to use medication to encourage the ovaries to produce more eggs than usual. The second one is 
related to medical accidents. IVF process is hand-made medical care that cannot be automated by 
instruments, and medical accidents such as embryo destruction and ICSI failures may occur (Yoshida, 2011). 
Thus, success rates vary among clinics depending on the medical and technical skills of both doctors and 
embryologists and accident avoidance efforts.  
 
3.3 Patient behavior 
Unfortunately, IVF can and does often fail at each stage: there may be no eggs to collect or there may be no 
embryos to be transferred because fertilizing eggs is failed or the embryos stop growing before transfer. 
How patients would do if they have been trying it many times but unsuccessful at one clinic? They have 
three options: one is to give up the fertility treatment and go on life without children or with adopted 
children; second is to try one more cycle in the same clinic (I call this action as vertical treatment); third is 
to move to another clinic to receive treatment from a new doctor (I call this action as horizontal treatment).6 
Patients who have experienced IVF many times and continue to do it may have strong demand for having 
children. Such patients may choose the third option if they can find another clinic with a higher success rate 
than the current clinic via the HEFA’s online service.7 The success of IVF is defined as giving birth not 
getting pregnant because if patients have a miscarriage, then they often go to a clinic to try it again. 
There is both positive and negative effect of moving to another clinic on the treatment outcome. The 
positive effects arise if patients receive treatment from better doctors and embryologists, resulting in higher 
success rates. The negative effects arise by moving to another clinic. If the patient has been treated at the 
 
5 Hamilton et al. (2018) clearly illustrate the IVF stages． 
6 Because of pooled cross-section data, we cannot know who and when stops the treatment. 
7 Even if information about other clinics is disclosed, it will be difficult for patients to know in advance what 
treatment methods will be provided at those clinics. Patients are simply expecting to receive a new treatment by 
a new doctor and to get better results. 
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same clinic many times, the doctors at that clinic know the patient's characteristics well. If patients move to 
another clinic, they will give up on the next IVF treatment that might be successful in that clinic. In this 




The data used in this study are drawn from the HFEA’s Anonymized Register. The HFEA collects data for 
patients who registered to the HFEA and received fertility treatments from 1991 to 2016. By law, clinics 
must submit data to the HFEA. Thus, the register may include close to 100% of patients’ information. This 
data is anonymized, meaning that no identifiers are present and some of the personal information is banded 
to protect the patient's privacy (e.g., pooled cross-sectional data). 
The patients in the data are classified by age: 18–34, 35–37, 38–39, 40–42, 43–44, 45–50 years old. The 
data includes individual treatment outcomes as follows: the total number of embryos, that allow transferring 
into a womb, created in one treatment cycle; the live birth occurrence, which indicates whether the patient 
gives one or more births as a result of this cycle; the total number of previous cycles of IVF or and Donor 
Insemination (DI) the patient has previously had (I call it as “tnpc”); the total number of previous cycles of 
IVF the patient has previously had (I call it as “tnpc of IVF”); the total number of previous cycles of IVF or 
DI the patient has previously had at the clinic associated with this treatment (I call it as “tnpc at the clinic”). 
Thus, if tnpc is larger than tnpc at the clinic, then the patients have changed the clinic at least more than 
once. I use tnpc and tnpc at the clinic to construct a dummy variable, denoted as changeit in equation (1), 
indicating whether a patent has moved to another clinic at least more than once.8  
From the Register, I draw my primary sample based on tnpc of IVF; I extract patients who have 
previously received IVF at least more than once between the years 1991 and 2016 from the Register. I 
exclude patients who miss the total number of embryos created in one cycle (the number of such patients is 
23,161). As a result of sampling, 641,750 patients are a full sample of the paper. Based on the probability 
of success, I classify observations into four groups by age: 18–34, 35–39, 40–42, and over 43.9 Figure 1 
 
8 In my sample, I was concerned about measurement errors in the dummy variable. Because the data do not 
contain information on when patients moved to another clinic, we do not know whether patients registered in 
2009 moved to another clinic before or after 2009. The number of patients registered in 2009 is 30,615 (4.8% of 
the full sample). I can obtain the same result, even if I exclude these patients from the analysis. Patient try IVF 
twelve times a year at most because of the menstrual cycle, but IVF often fail at each stage and average tnpc at 
the clinic is 1.79. Thus, this measurement error might not arise for patients registered between 2010 and 2016. In 
addition, we cannot know an exact value for both tnpc and tnpc at the clinic if these variables are more than the 
value of 6 (i.e. the maximum value of these variables is 6 even though it is more than the value of 6). Thus, if 
both values are more than 6, then we cannot identify whether patients have moved to another clinic. The number 
of patients whose tnpc and tnpc at the clinic are both more than 6 is 25,579 (4.0% of the full sample). I can obtain 
the same result even if I exclude these patients from the analysis. 
9  NHS presents the percentage of IVF treatments that resulted in a live birth between 2014 and 2016 
(https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/ivf/#targetText=Chances%20of%20success&targetText=IVF%20isn't%20usual
ly%20recommended,women%20aged%2035%20to%2037, last accessed on 31st October 2019) 
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illustrates the change in the number of patients separated by the age groups. Table 1 provides sample means, 
standard deviations, min and max values for some variables of the full sample, pre-disclosure (the year from 
1991 to 2008), and post-disclosure (the year from 2009 to 2016). As shown in Table 1, the mean of 
“indicator of moving to another clinic”, representing whether the patient has moved to another clinic, is 
larger in post-disclosure than pre-disclosure for all age groups. 
Focusing on the heterogeneity of patient’s characteristics in terms of the total number of previous cycles 
the patient has previously had (that relates to the patient’s demand for having children), I decompose the 
full sample into the following subsample:  
l Patients whose tnpc is between one and two times (431,339 patients, 67% of the full sample) ; 
l Patients whose tnpc is between three and four times (133,588 patients, 21% of the full sample) ; 
l Patients whose tnpc is more than five times (76,823 patients, 12% of the full sample); 
In addition, as a robustness check, I choose my sample period to be the observations within a three-year 
window around the year the information disclosure started. That is, the subsample is composed of  
l Patients who registered with the HFEA between 2006 and 2011 (181,310 patients, 28% of the full 
sample). 
 
5. Empirical strategies 
 
Effects of disclosure on the probability that a patient moves to another clinic.   To identify the effects of 
disclosure in individual clinic’s success rates on the probability that a patient moves to another clinic, I use 
the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Let changeit be an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the 
patient i in year t has changed the clinic at least once (i.e., tnpc is larger than tnpc at the clinic) and a value 
of zero otherwise. Let disclosuret be an indicator variable that takes a value of one after the information 
disclosure of clinics (after the year 2009), and a value of zero if the year is from 1991 to 2008. Let ageit be 
a vector of age group dummy variables including 35–39 that takes a value of one if a patient i is between 
35–39 years old, 40–42 that takes a value of one if the patient i is between 40–42 years old, and over43 that 
takes a value of one if the patient i is over 43 years old. I use 18–34 that takes a value of one if the patient i 
is between 18–34 years old is a baseline of the age group dummy variable. Let yeart be a vector of year 
dummy variables that control the year fixed effects. Then we may write  
 
(1) changeit = α0 + α1 disclosuret + α2 ageit + α3 disclosuret × ageit + α4 yeart + eit,    
 
where the coefficients α1 and α3 measure the effect of information disclosure on the probability that a patient 
moves to another clinic and eit is the error term.  
I would expect that α1 and α3 would be either positive or zero. α1 and α3 would reflect a positive 
relationship if patients could find at least one better clinic. On the other hand, α1 and α3 would reflect a zero 
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if all patients could not find at least one better clinic from the comprehensive viewpoint of success rates, 
patient rating, and so on.  
 
Effect of moving to another clinic on the probability of creating transferable embryos.   I evaluate the 
quality of the clinic by using whether the probability that a patient gets one or more transferable embryos 
(i.e. whether a patient reaches stage 4 of IVF) in one treatment cycle is improved or not. Let stage4it be an 
indicator variable that takes a value of one if the patient i gets at least more than one embryo in one cycle 
in year t and takes a value of zero otherwise. Estimates are based on a simple linear model for stage4it. Then 
we may write   
 
(2) stage4it = β0 + β1 changeit + β2 ageit + β3 changeit × ageit + β4 yeart + vit,   
 
where the coefficient β1 is the effect of moving to another clinic on the probability that a patient i aged 18–
34 (baseline) gets one or more embryos in one cycle, the coefficient β3 is the effect on the probability that 
individual i aged 35–39, 40–42, and over 43 gets one or more embryos in one cycle, and vit is the error term. 
transferit is a variable that includes changes in not only doctors and a treatment plan, such as whether 
stimulation is used and whether medication before correcting eggs for regulating the patient’s hormone 
balance is used, but also technical staffs such as embryologists that affect the probability of medical 
accidents.  
As I mentioned in subsection 3.3, I would expect that β1 and β3 would be positive or negative. The 
positive effects arise if patients could receive new treatments from better doctors and staff, resulting in the 
higher probability that they get the embryos in one cycle. The negative effects also arise because they have 
to give up the next IVF cycle in the previous clinic that might be successful. The chance of success for the 
marginal treatment cycle would be reduced if the new clinic is not better than the previous one.  
If transferit is correlated with unobserved components of (2), then β1 will be inconsistently estimated by 
OLS. In this case, a correlation may arise because whether patients transfer to another clinic to receive 
treatments by a new doctor is self-selected based on unobserved characteristics. So, the control and 
treatment groups (i.e. patients who have previously moved to another clinic or not moved) are not randomly 
assigned. To overcome the self-selection problem, I use disclosuret as an Instrumental Variable (IV) for 
transferit. The first stage regression is 
 
(3)               transferit = γ0 + γ1 disclosuret + γ2 ageit + γ3 yeart＋eit. 
 
If γ1 is not zero at a sufficiently small significance level the F-statistics that refers to F-tests of the 
significance of the instrument in the regressions is more than 10, we can say that disclosure is relevant for 
explaining variation in transferit. In addition, because disclosure is just a policy variable related to time, it 
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is only natural to assume that disclosure is uncorrelated with unobserved characteristics of patients. In other 
words, disclosuret affects stage4it only though whether the patient decides to move to another clinic. 
Before the disclosure, patients decide to move to another clinic without knowing whether the success 
rate of the new clinic is better than that of the previous one. After the disclosure, patients can choose the 
new clinic after knowing its success rate. Therefore, by comparing the coefficients of stage4it before and 
after disclosure, we can answer whether the patient could choose a better clinic than the previous clinic by 
the disclosure; that is, whether the probability that the patient gets the embryos in one cycle is improved by 
moving to another clinic.  
 
Effects of whether a patient gets the embryos in one treatment cycle on live birth occurrence.   Finally, I 
estimate the effect of whether a patient gets one or more embryos in one cycle on the probability of live 
birth by OLS. The estimation equation is as follows:  
 
(4)         livebirthit = π0 + π1 stage4it + π2 ageit + π3 stage4it × ageit + π4 Xit + π5 yeart + uit, 
 
where livebirthit is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if there were one or more live births as a 
result of this cycle and a value of zero otherwise, Xit is a vector of treatment methods including 
embryos_transferit that represents the number of embryos transferred into the patient in this cycle and 
frozenit that takes a value of one if frozen embryos are used in this cycle and a value of zero otherwise, and  
uit is the error term. The coefficients of interest are π1 and π3 which measure the effect of whether a patient 
gets one or more embryos on the live birth occurrence in different age groups. I would expect that π1 and π3 
would be positive, and π1 would be greater than π3 because, usually, the older patient has the lower the 
success rate.  
 
6. Results and discussion   
 
6.1 Main results  
Effects of disclosure on the probability that a patient moves to another clinic.  Table 2 reports the effect of 
information disclosure on the probability that a patient moves to another clinic, based on the discontinuity-
based OLS regression specified in equation (1). Columns 1–3 show the results that are not separated by age 
groups. I find that without controlling year and age fixed effects, information disclosure induces patients to 
move to another clinic by 4.19 percent, but by controlling both year and age fixed effects, the effect is 13.5 
percent. In column 4, I turn to the results separated by age group. I also find that information disclosure 
induces patients aged 18–34, 35–39, 40–42, and over43 to move to another clinic by 11.8, 14.1, 16.4, and 
14.8 percent, respectively.  
The intuitive reason why patients aged 40–42 have the highest probability is as follows. Doctors explain 
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to their patients that the success rate decreases significantly with age, and is much lower after the age of 43. 
So, patients want to have IVF as high success rates as possible. If patients have been trying IVF for a while 
to get pregnant but have been unsuccessful, they move to another clinic before they are over 43 years old 
to receive the treatment from a new doctor that is likely to succeed. Patients aged over 43 have the second-
largest probability. The intuitive reason for this is as follows. Since doctors need higher skills to lead the 
older patients to success in IVF, the variance in success rates of older patients among clinics (more precisely, 
the variance in the skills among doctors) is larger. Thus, it is easier for patients aged over 43 to find a clinic 
with higher success rates than the previous clinic. Moreover, patients who continue IVF even though they 
face a low success rate may have a stronger demand for a child. Thus, if they find another clinic with a 
higher success rate, then they do not give up getting pregnant through IVF and continue it at the clinic. On 
the other hand, the youngest patients have the lowest results because it is difficult to find another clinic that 
has a substantially higher success rate than the current clinic; that is, it is difficult to choose another clinic 
so that the marginal expected benefit of trying IVF at another clinic is substantially larger than the marginal 
cost of stopping IVF at the current clinic. 
The result in column 3 is consistent with the first stage estimates based on the specification in equation 
(3). I empirically prove that all the effects of disclosure on the probability that a patient moves to another 
clinic are positive and statistically significant with corresponding F statistics far beyond the typical rules of 
thumb values for instrument relevance.  
There are no external shocks that affect the probability that a patient moves to another clinic in the year 
2009. For example, one of the external shocks is health care services that make it easier to try the treatment. 
Since they do not have to pay the full cost of the treatment, they can afford to pay the cost of moving to 
another clinic and try it at the new clinic. The UK has the National Health Service (NHS), a tax-funded 
institution that ensures that UK healthcare is free at the point of delivery, but fertility treatments including 
IVF have been available since 2004 through the NHS (Werber, 2018). 
 
Effect of moving to another clinic on the probability of creating transferable embryos.   Table 3 contains 
the IV estimates of the effects of moving to another clinic on the probability that a patient gets one or more 
embryos (i.e. whether a patient reaches stage 4 in the IVF process) in one treatment cycle, based on the 
second stage specification in equation (2). Table 3 also shows, for comparison, the OLS estimates (without 
IV) on the effect of disclosure on the probability. The main results are shown in column 2. 
In column 2, the coefficient of Clinic (aged 18–34) is -0.468 at a 99% significant level, which means 
that if a patient aged 18–34 moves to another clinic, then the probability that the patient gets the embryos 
in one cycle decreases. From this result, I say that the negative effect of moving (i.e., the margins cost of 
giving up the next IVF cycle at the previous clinic that might be successful) dominates the positive effect 
(i.e., the marginal benefit of receiving treatment from a better doctor and staffs) for patients aged 18–34. I 
also find that, by moving to another clinic, the coefficients of Clinic-age-cross-term are 0.275, 0.525, and 
13 
 
0.604 for patients aged 35–39, 40–42, and over 35, respectively. Combining the baseline results with the 
cross-term results, I can obtain that the negative effect of moving to another clinic is dominant for patients 
aged under 39, but the positive effect is dominant for patients aged over 40.  
Interestingly, the older patients are, the greater the magnitude of the positive effect is (i.e. by moving to 
another clinic, the older patients have the greater increase in the probability that they get one or more 
embryos in one cycle). The intuitive interpretation is as follows. The success rate of older patients is 
extremely low, and thus it is quite difficult for doctors to make patients give birth. This means that the 
variance of doctor’s skills is quite large. As a result, it is better to move to another clinic to receive the 
treatment based on the new treatment plan provided by a new doctor and embryologists than to continue it 
at the previous clinic where they have been unsuccessful for a while. On the other hand, the success rate of 
young patients is relatively higher. In other words, the skill difference among doctors has little effect on the 
treatment result of young patients. As a result, it is better to continue IVF at the previous clinic than to 
receive it from a new doctor because the previous doctor knows about the medical characteristics of patients 
more than the new doctor and thus the next treatment at the previous clinic has a higher success rate than 
that at the current one. Consequently, I conclude that the change in a doctor and the treatment plan through 
moving to another clinic on treatment results are more critical to old patients than young patients.  
There are completely different results between OLS regression and IV regression. The estimates in 
column 1, which are results from OLS regressions, show that the effect of moving is positive for all patients 
and its magnitude is decreased with age. In addition, the coefficients of the age dummy are positive for all 
age groups, which is completely different from the real success rates in IVF. Normally, since the youngest 
patients have the best success rate, the coefficients are negative and decrease with age. Consequently, the 
results of OLS regression have a bias, and we have to deal with the endogeneity problem caused by the self-
selection of whether patients move to another clinic or not.10 
 
Effects of whether a patient gets the embryos in one treatment cycle on live birth occurrence.   Finally, I 
show the relationship between whether a patient gets the embryos and the live birth occurrence based on 
the OLS specification in equation (4). In column 1 of Table 4, I find that when a patient gets one or more 
embryos in one cycle, the probability of live birth is increased by 10.0 percent. In column 2, I find that, by 
controlling the age fixed effects, it is increased by 2.1–12.2 percent, and that the increase rate drastically 
decreases at the age of over 40. In addition, I find that the more embryos are transferred into a womb, the 
more probability of live birth a patient has and that when patients use frozen embryos, they have a higher 
probability of live birth.  
 
10 I test for endogeneity of clinicit in equation (2) by obtaining the residuals it from estimating the reduced form 
regression: clinicit =γ0 + γ1 ageit + γ2 yeart + γ3 zit + vit. Adding it into the structural equation: stage4it = β0 + β1 
clinicit + β2 ageit + β2 yeart + δ1 it + ηit. The coefficient on it is δ1 = -10.14, and t = -965.79. I conclude that 







6.2 Heterogeneous effect 
Table 5 reports the results of heterogeneity analysis. Columns 1 and 2 show the results for patients who 
have previously had IVF and/or DI between one and two times, three and four times, and more than five 
times, respectively. I find that the effect in column 2 is much larger than that in column 1 and the effect in 
column 3 is also larger than that in column 2. This result implies that patients who have had more experience 
of failure are more affected by the disclosure than those who have had less experience. The intuitive 
interpretation behind the result is straightforward. Those who have had IVF many times may have a stronger 
demand for children, but they have been unsuccessful while paying high treatment costs (including financial 
costs and psychological costs) at the current clinic. If they find a better clinic in terms of success rates and 
the patients’ rating, the marginal expected benefit of the next treatment at the new clinic is larger than the 
marginal expected cost of giving up the fertility treatment at the current clinic.  
In addition, I consider a further specification that uses only observations within a three-year window 
around the year information disclosure started. In column 3, I find that the effect of disclosure is positive 
but its magnitude is smaller than that of results so far. The reason is that because of a three-year window, I 
capture only the short-term effects; that is, I cannot capture the long-term effect based on the behavior that 
patients search the information but do not move to another clinic right after the searching. 
Table 6 shows the second-stage regression results using each subsample. In column 1, I find a similar 
result to the results using the full sample, but the negative effect of moving to another clinic dominates the 
positive effect for all age groups. This suggests that the patients who have previously had treatments less 
than two times should have one more cycle at the current clinic. In column 2, I can obtain a different result 
from that of the full sample, which is that the effect of moving is not statistically significant at even 10 
percent level for patients aged 18–34, while the effect is positive for the other age groups and its magnitude 
becomes larger for older patients. In column 3, I find a different result from that of the full sample; that is, 
the effect of moving to another clinic is positive for all age groups. These results suggest that the positive 
effect of moving dominates the negative effect if the patient has previously had the treatment more than 
four times. In other words, such patients are less likely to succeed if they repeat the treatment at the current 
clinic and should move to another clinic to receive the treatment from a new doctor.  
In column 4, I find two things. First, I obtain similar results to those reported in column 2 of Table 2. 
Thus, the results are robust even if we use observations within a three-year window. Second, the magnitude 
of coefficients is larger for all age groups than that reported in column 2 of Table 2. In particular, the results 
for a patient aged over 40 is more than 50 percent increase in the probability that the patient gets the embryos 
in one cycle. This implies that the short-term effect of information disclosure on the probability is quite 
large.  
   Table 7 shows the likelihood of live birth for patients who reach stage 4 of the IVF process using each 
subsample. Columns 1–3 show similar results to those obtained using the full sample. This implies that once 
15 
 
patients get one or more embryos and it is transplanted into a womb, the likelihood of live birth does not 
crucially depend on the number of past treatment cycles. In column 4, I also find a similar result to those 
reported in columns 1–3. 
 
7. Overall effect of information disclosure on the number of deliveries  
 
In this section, using the results reported in column 1–3 of Table 5, 6, and 7, I obtain a back-of-the-envelope 
estimate of the magnitude of a per-patient increase in the live birth occurrence due to information disclosure 
by multiplying my estimates of the change in the probability that a patient moves to another clinic by the 
disclosure, times the change in the probability that a patient gets the embryos in one cycle by moving to 
another clinic, times the change in the live birth occurrence by getting the embryos. For example, I can 
obtain the magnitude by γ1 × β1 × π1 for patients aged 18–34. Since livebirthit takes a value of one if a patient 
gives one or more births (i.e. counting twins, triplets, and quadruplets as single birth), thus I can interpret 
the magnitude as the number of delivery. Moreover, multiplying this value times the number of patients 
between 2009 and 2016 yields how many deliveries are changed in response to the information disclosure. 
The age-specific back-of-the-envelope estimates for each subsample are reported in Table 8. For 
example, I calculate the increase in the live birth occurrence (or the minimum increase in the number of live 
birth) per patient aged 18–34 who have previously had treatments more than five times, as 0.506 × 0.600 × 
0.130 = 0.039. Multiplying this value times the number of corresponding patients between 2009 and 2016 
(that is 6,156 patients) yields 240 deliveries. This calculation implies that the information disclosure will be 
associated with at least 240 births. The total increase in the number of deliveries due to the positive effect 
of moving to another clinic is 845 even though there are negative effects. In the UK there were 283 births 
of patients aged 18–34 as a result of the treatment cycle in 2016 (HEFA, 2018). These calculations are meant 
only as back-of-the-envelope estimates, but they make clear that the improvement in the number of live 
birth by information disclosure is socially significant. 
 
 
8. Conclusion  
 
By using the instrumental variable technique, this study explores: (I) whether the disclosure of 
individual clinic’s success rates induces patients to move to another clinic; and (II) whether patients have a 
higher rate of getting the embryos in one treatment cycle when moving to another clinic. There are both 
merit and demerit of moving to another clinic. The merit is that patients could receive treatments from a 
better doctor and staff. The demerit is that they have to give up the future treatment cycle at the previous 




The findings and policy implications are as follows. (i) The information disclosure significantly induces 
patients to move to another clinic. (ii) The greater the number of treatment cycles a patient has previously 
had, the greater the probability of moving to another clinic. (iii) The merit of moving to another clinic 
dominates for patients aged more than 40. The demerit dominates for patients aged less than 39 despite 
moving to another clinic with higher success rates than the previous clinic via online services. (iv) 
Regardless of age, the merit dominates for patients who have previously had treatments more than five 
times. These results suggest that younger patients or patients who have previously had treatment less than 
three should do vertical treatments (that is trying one more cycle in the same clinic), while older patients or 
patients who have been unsuccessful for a while should do horizontal treatments (that is moving to another 
clinic to receive the treatment from a new doctor), resulting in the reduction of both financial and 
psychological costs of patients. This study empirically shows that efficient matching between clinics and 
relatively old patients who have been unsuccessful for a while are promoted by information disclosure, 
resulting in a higher success rate. However, it also induces the young patients who have little experience of 
the treatment to move to the other clinic, resulting in lower success rates. 
There has been no theoretical and empirical analysis of how the clinic’s information disclosure of 
individual clinics affects success rates of fertility treatments by focusing on a matching between clinics and 
patients. This study contributes to understanding the policy effect on the problem of welfare reduction, 
which is an important issue related to fertility treatments, due to heavy financial and psychological costs. 
Information disclosure may affect the patient’s decision whether they give up the treatment or continue the 
treatment, and it may affect how many treatment cycles it takes to succeed.  
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Figure 1—The number of age-specific patients who have had IVF more than once between 1991 and 2016  
Notes: This graph illustrates the change in the number of patients I use in this study from 1990 to 2016 (the total number of 
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Table 1—Descriptive statistics 
 18–34 years old  35–39 years old 
 Mean S.D. Min Max  Mean S.D. Min Max 
Full sample         
Indicator of moving to another 
clinic  
Live birth occurrence 
Indicator of getting embryos 


































Observations  258,990    253,534   
Pre-disclosure (1991–2008)         
Indicator of moving another clinic 
Live birth occurrence 
Indicator of getting embryos 


































Observations 149,351    136,278   
Post-disclosure (2009–2016)         
Indicator of moving another clinic 
Live birth occurrence 
Indicator of getting embryos 


































Observations 109,639    117,256   
 40–42 years old  43–50 years old 
 Mean S.D. Min Max  Mean S.D. Min Max 
Full sample          
Indicator of moving another clinic 
Live birth occurrence 
Indicator of getting embryos 


































Observations 89,382    39,844   
Pre-disclosure (1991–2008) 
Indicator of moving another clinic 
Live birth occurrence 
Indicator of getting embryos 










































Observations 42,100    18,461   
Post-disclosure (2009–2016) 
Indicator of moving another clinic 
Live birth occurrence 
Indicator of getting embryos 










































Observations 47,282    21,383   
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics for patients who have previously had IVF at least more than once (i.e., the 
total number of previous IVF cycles ≥ 1) before and after the disclosure. Indicator of moving to another clinic” equals 
clinicit in equation (1). Indicator of getting embryos equals stage4it in equation (2), which takes a value of one if a patient 
gets one or more embryos in one treatment cycle and a value of zero otherwise. 
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Table 2—Effects of disclosure on the probability that a patient moves to another clinic 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All patients All patients All patients All patients 
   (First stage)  
Disclosure 0.0419*** 0.150*** 0.135*** 0.118*** 
 (0.00104) (0.0102) (0.0105) (0.0105) 
Disclosure×35–39    0.0233*** 
    (0.00225) 
Disclosure×40–42    0.0457*** 
    (0.00334) 
Disclosure×over43    0.0304*** 
    (0.00492) 
35–39 years old   0.0584*** 0.0483*** 
   (0.00111) (0.00146) 
40–42 years old   0.104*** 0.0814*** 
   (0.00167) (0.00231) 
over43 years old   0.153*** 0.139*** 
   (0.00246) (0.00351) 
Constant 0.199*** 0.0536*** 0.0162 0.0226** 
 (0.000678) (0.0100) (0.0103) (0.0103) 
Year fixed effects  No Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistics   165  
Observations 641,750 641,750 641,750 641,750 
R-squared 0.003 0.006 0.018 0.018 
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if a patient has changed the clinic at least 
one time and a value of zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, 
and * denotes p<0.1. The F-statistics in the table refers to F-tests of the significance of the instrument in the first-stage 


















Table 3—Effects of moving to another clinic on the probability that a patient get embryos in one cycle: 
results from OLS and 2SLS (IV regression) 
 (1) (2) 
 OLS  2SLS  
   
Clinic (aged 18–34) 0.180*** -0.468*** 
 (0.00240) (0.164) 
Clinic×35–39 -0.0494*** 0.275*** 
 (0.00324) (0.0468) 
Clinic×40–42 -0.0737*** 0.525*** 
 (0.00424) (0.0663) 
Clinic×over43 -0.0778*** 0.604*** 
 (0.00566) (0.0949) 
35–39 years old 0.0453*** 0.00910 
 (0.00154) (0.0136) 
40–42 years old 0.0693*** -0.0285 
 (0.00221) (0.0242) 
over43 years old 0.0422*** -0.0801** 
 (0.00322) (0.0389) 
Constant 0.462*** 0.505*** 
 (0.0222) (0.0246) 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes 
Observations 641,750 641,750 
R-squared 0.027 0.013 
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a patient gets 
at least more than one embryo in one treatment cycle, and zero otherwise. Robust standard 


















Table 4—Effects of whether a patient gets embryos in one cycle on the live birth occurrence 
  (1) (2) 
 All patients All patients 
      
Stage4  0.100*** 0.122*** 
 (0.00128) (0.00186) 
Stage4×35–39  -0.0403*** 
  (0.00225) 
Stage4×40–42  -0.101*** 
  (0.00277) 
Stage4×over43  -0.0975*** 
  (0.00368) 
35–39 years old  -0.0272*** 
  (0.00160) 
40–42 years old  -0.0750*** 
  (0.00204) 
over43 years old  -0.0775*** 
  (0.00266) 
Embryos transfer 0.0663*** 0.0719*** 
 (0.000579) (0.000569) 
Frozen 0.0676*** 0.0482*** 
 (0.00127) (0.00127) 
Constant -0.109*** -0.0900*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0113) 
Age fixed effects No Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes 
Observations 641,750 641,750 
R-squared 0.041 0.058 
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if there were 
one or more live births as a result of this cycle and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors 















Table 5—Effects of disclosure on the probability that a patient move to another clinic:  
Heterogeneity analysis (First stage regression results) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Patients whose 
tnpc 1–2 times  
Patients whose 
tnpc 3–4 times  
Patients whose 




2006 and 2011 
     
Disclosure  0.0548*** 0.323*** 0.506*** 0.0444*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0118) (0.00774) (0.00333) 
Age fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Disclosure×age terms  No No No No 
Observations 431,339 133,588 76,823 181,310 
F-statistics 27 751 4,283 177 
R-squared 0.010 0.017 0.013 0.012 
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the patient i in year t has changed the 
clinic at least one time and a value of zero otherwise. “tnpc” means the total number of previous cycles of IVF or DI the 
patient has previously had. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes 
p<0.1. The F-statistics in the table refers to F-tests of the significance of the instrument in the first-stage regressions 
specified in equation (3). 
 
 
Table 6—Effects of moving to another clinic on the probability that a patient gets embryos:  
Heterogeneity analysis (Second stage regression results) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Patients whose 
tnpc 1–2 times  
Patients whose 
tnpc 3–4 times 
 
Patients whose 
tnpc ≥ 5 times  
Patients who 
registered between 
2006 and 2011 
        
Clinic -0.877** 0.222 0.600*** -0.365*** 
 (0.415) (0.476) (0.116) (0.122) 
Clinic×35–39 0.301*** 0.128** 0.0545 0.351** 
 (0.0691) (0.0641) (0.103) (0.139) 
Clinic×40–42 0.418*** 0.314*** 0.351*** 0.884*** 
 (0.100) (0.0830) (0.117) (0.182) 
Clinic×over43 0.461*** 0.472*** 0.300** 0.897*** 
 (0.149) (0.117) (0.140) (0.266) 
Age fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 431,339 133,588 76,823 181,310 
R-squared 0.015 0.011 0.009 0.003 
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a patient gets at least more than one embryo 
in one treatment cycle, and zero otherwise. “tnpc” means the total number of previous cycles of IVF or DI the patient has 





Table 7— Effects of whether a patient gets embryos in one cycle on the live birth occurrence:  
Heterogeneity analysis 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Patients whose 
tnpc 1–2 times  
Patients whose 
tnpc 3–4 times 
 
Patients whose 
tnpc ≥ 5 times  
Patients who 
registered between 
2006 and 2011 
        
Stage4 0.120*** 0.127*** 0.130*** 0.141*** 
 (0.00221) (0.00432) (0.00634) (0.00379) 
Stage4×35–39 -0.0401*** -0.0452*** -0.0517*** -0.0549*** 
 (0.00271) (0.00504) (0.00723) (0.00442) 
Stage4×40–42 -0.101*** -0.111*** -0.110*** -0.134*** 
 (0.00347) (0.00605) (0.00792) (0.00517) 
Stage4×over43 -0.110*** -0.0968*** -0.0923*** -0.133*** 
 (0.00486) (0.00780) (0.00910) (0.00696) 
Age fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 431,339 133,588 76,823 181,310 
R-squared 0.059 0.055 0.052 0.057 
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if there were one or more live births as a 
result of this cycle and that takes zero otherwise. “tnpc” means the total number of previous cycles of IVF or DI the patient 





















Table 8—The per-patient minimally change in the number of live birth by information disclosure:  
Back-of-the-envelope estimates 
  (1)  (2) 
























Patient aged 18–34 84344 -0.0058 -489  19139 0 0 
Patient aged 35–39 78221 -0.0025 -196  25983 0.0034 88 
Patient aged 40–42 27534 -0.0005 -14  11869 0.0016 19 
Patient aged over43 11273 -0.0002 -2  5305 0.0046 24 
Total   -701    132 
 (3)   













    
Patient aged 18–34 6156 0.039 240     
Patient aged 35–39 13142 0.024 315     
Patient aged 40–42 7879 0.0096 76     
Patient aged over43 4805 0.017 82     
Total   713     
Notes: The values are obtained by γ1 × β1 × π1 for patients aged 18–34. Per-patient change in live birth occurrence can 
interpret as the change in the number of deliveries per patient. Total change in the number of delivery is obtained by 
multiplying the number of patients after 2009 times per-patient change in live birth occurrence. 
 
 
